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Introduction * Shifting cultivation, a land-use system based on the slash-and-burn method of land preparation, and locally know... ScienceDirect.com Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord - Wikipedia The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (Bengali: পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম শান্তি চুক্তি) was a peace agreement signed between the Gover... Wikipedia Conflict among Indigenous Communities and Settler Bengali ... ABSTRACT. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)i of southeastern Bangladesh is the most isolated and geographically unique region of th... UniversePG Land Rights of the Indigenous People of the Chittagong Hill ... Jan 1, 2002 —

Title: The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Identity, Autonomy, and Resource Conflict in Bangladesh’s Periphery Author: [Generated for Academic Purposes] Date: April 13, 2026 Abstract The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in southeastern Bangladesh represent a unique geopolitical and ethno-cultural enclave within a predominantly homogeneous Bengali nation-state. Unlike the rest of the country, the CHT is characterized by its hilly topography, indigenous (Jumma) population, and a protracted history of armed conflict, state-led colonization, and peace negotiations. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the CHT, tracing its historical marginalization from the British colonial period through Pakistani rule and post-independence Bangladesh. It examines the root causes of the insurgency (1972–1997), the contested implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord, and contemporary challenges, including land alienation, militarization, climate-induced displacement, and resource extraction (hydropower, timber, and tourism). The paper argues that despite nominal political autonomy, the CHT remains a site of structural violence, where demographic transformation through state-sponsored Bengali settlement continues to undermine indigenous rights. It concludes with policy recommendations for genuine decentralization, land restitution, and cultural preservation. 1. Introduction The Chittagong Hill Tracts, covering approximately 13,295 square kilometers (about 10% of Bangladesh’s land area), are an anomaly in a country defined by riverine plains and dense population. Comprising three districts—Rangamati, Khagrachhari, and Bandarban—the CHT shares borders with India (Tripura and Mizoram) and Myanmar (Rakhine State). Home to at least 11 distinct indigenous ethnic groups (collectively self-identifying as Jumma , referring to their slash-and-burn cultivation method), the region has been in a state of simmering conflict since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. The central tension lies in the clash between the Bengali nation-state’s assimilationist model and the indigenous demand for territorial autonomy and cultural distinctiveness. This paper synthesizes historical, political, and environmental perspectives to answer: Why has the CHT Peace Accord of 1997 failed to resolve the region’s core grievances? The analysis will proceed chronologically and thematically, addressing colonial legacies, post-colonial state-building, armed resistance, peace processes, and contemporary ecological conflicts. 2. Historical Background: The Making of a Periphery 2.1 Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era Prior to British rule, the CHT was a loosely governed frontier zone under the influence of Arakanese and Tripuri kings, with local chiefs ( Rajas ) maintaining customary land tenure systems. The British annexed the region in 1760–1761 through the East India Company but recognized its distinctiveness. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation of 1900 was a pivotal instrument: it divided the region into three circles (Chakma, Mong, and Bohmong), each under a hereditary chief, and restricted land ownership and settlement to indigenous peoples. Bengali migration was prohibited. This created a protected enclave, preserving indigenous autonomy at the cost of isolation. 2.2 Pakistani Period (1947–1971) After the Partition of India, the CHT was incorporated into East Pakistan. The state continued the colonial policy of restricting Bengali in-migration, but large-scale infrastructure projects—notably the Kaptai Dam (1957–1962)—displaced over 100,000 Chakma people, destroying 40% of their arable land. This event triggered the first major indigenous exodus to India and planted the seeds of armed resistance. The Pakistani state also initiated military cantonments in the region, viewing it as a strategic border zone against India and Myanmar. 3. Post-Independence Bangladesh: From Exclusion to Insurgency 3.1 The Bengali Nationalist Project When Bangladesh emerged in 1971, the new state rejected the colonial and Pakistani frameworks of exception for the CHT. The Constitution of 1972 declared Bangladesh a unitary, secular, Bengali nationalist state, offering no special recognition of indigenous peoples. In 1973, the government abrogated the 1900 Regulation, opened the CHT to Bengali settlement, and began constructing the Kaptai-Khagrachhari road , breaching the region’s historical isolation. Thousands of landless Bengalis, encouraged by state subsidies, moved into the CHT, often settling on indigenous jhum fields. 3.2 The Shanti Bahini Insurgency (1972–1997) In response, indigenous students and former Mukti Bahini members formed the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) in 1972, and its armed wing, Shanti Bahini , in 1973. Their demands evolved from cultural recognition to full autonomy for a unified CHT. The Bangladeshi military responded with a counterinsurgency strategy that included:

Massive militarization: By the 1980s, the army had established over 300 camps, making the CHT the most militarized region per capita in South Asia. Forced relocation: Entire villages were burned; an estimated 200,000–400,000 indigenous people fled to India between 1975 and 1990. Demographic engineering: Bengali settlers increased from 2% of the CHT population in 1951 to over 50% by 1991, according to unofficial estimates.

International pressure, particularly from India (which hosted Shanti Bahini camps), and the election of the Awami League government in 1996 finally forced negotiations. 4. The 1997 Peace Accord: Promise and Betrayal The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord , signed on December 2, 1997, between the government and PCJSS, was hailed as a historic resolution. Its key provisions included: chittagong hill tracts

Administrative devolution: Creation of a regional council (RC) with powers over non-reserved subjects (e.g., agriculture, local police, land management). Land commission: A CHT Land Disputes Resolution Commission to adjudicate claims between indigenous peoples and Bengali settlers. Rehabilitation of returnees: Repatriation of refugees and withdrawal of half the army. Demilitarization: Removal of temporary army camps.

4.1 Implementation Gaps Two decades later, the accord remains largely unimplemented:

The Regional Council has no control over law and order; the army retains a parallel chain of command, and the district administrations report directly to Dhaka. The Land Commission is underfunded and legally weak; most land disputes are decided in civilian courts that do not recognize customary rights. Since 1997, over 100,000 acres of indigenous land have been transferred to Bengali settlers through dubious means. Militarization persists: While formal army camps decreased, military intelligence and rapid action battalions remain omnipresent. Extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture continue to be documented by human rights organizations (e.g., Amnesty International, 2022). Autochthonous fragmentation: A faction of the PCJSS (led by Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, aka Santu Larma) supports the accord, but splinter groups (e.g., United People’s Democratic Front – UPDF) accuse the PCJSS of co-optation and have resumed low-level violence. Introduction * Shifting cultivation, a land-use system based

5. Contemporary Conflicts: Land, Resources, and Identity 5.1 Land Alienation Land is the core grievance. The Bengali settler population now outnumbers indigenous groups in all three CHT districts. Under the Bengali settler protection policy , evicting illegal occupants is politically impossible. Meanwhile, indigenous jhum cultivation is criminalized as “forest destruction” under Bangladesh’s Forest Act, despite being central to Jumma identity. 5.2 Hydropower and Environmental Injustice The Kaptai Dam remains a symbol of dispossession. Newer projects, such as the Sajjo Valley hydroelectric project and the Matamuhuri dam , threaten to displace additional communities without consultation. Indigenous protests have been met with police repression. Climate change exacerbates this: erratic rainfall affects jhum cycles, and flash floods from upstream Indian dams damage remaining lowland fields. 5.3 Tourism and Cultural Commodification The Bangladeshi government promotes the CHT as an “exotic” ecotourism destination (e.g., Boga Lake, Nilgiri, Sajek Valley). While tourism generates revenue, it also accelerates land grabs, disrupts sacred sites, and pressures indigenous women into the sex trade (documented in Sajek Valley). Moreover, tourists are often accompanied by military escorts, reinforcing the occupation narrative. 5.4 The Rohingya Crisis Spillover Since 2017, the influx of over 700,000 Rohingya refugees into Cox’s Bazar—adjacent to the CHT—has intensified resource competition. Deforestation for refugee camps and increased army patrols in border areas have restricted indigenous access to forest products. Some indigenous groups fear that the Rohingya presence will further normalize Bengali-Muslim demographic dominance. 6. Theoretical Framework: Internal Colonialism The CHT case fits the internal colonialism model (Hechter, 1975). The Bengali state systematically:

Segregates the periphery spatially and legally, Exploits its natural resources (timber, water, minerals) for core regions, Reproduces cultural inferiority through education and media that erase indigenous history, Maintains political subordination via military rule and puppet local councils.

Unlike classical colonialism, internal colonialism operates without formal secession but with similar structures of dispossession and racialized hierarchy (indigenous = “primitive”, Bengali = “civilized”). 7. Policy Recommendations To move beyond the failed accord, the following measures are necessary: ABSTRACT

Full implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord with international monitoring, including transfer of police and land administration powers to the Regional Council. Land restitution mechanism: A binding, fast-track tribunal with indigenous majority to adjudicate claims; halt all further Bengali settlements in the CHT. Cultural and linguistic recognition: Include Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and other indigenous languages in primary education; repeal the 2010 “Indigenous Peoples” to “Small Ethnic Groups” renaming, which undermines UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) recognition. Demilitarization roadmap: Phase out all non-border army camps; replace military intelligence with a civilian ombudsman. Resource revenue sharing: Ensure CHT institutions receive 50% of hydropower and tourism revenues. Climate adaptation fund specifically for jhum communities affected by dam construction and erratic rainfall.

8. Conclusion The Chittagong Hill Tracts remain an unresolved wound in Bangladesh’s national fabric. The 1997 Peace Accord was a necessary but insufficient step—a cease-fire that froze injustice rather than reversing it. As long as land alienation continues, the army retains control, and Bengali nationalism denies plurinational reality, the CHT will remain a potential flashpoint. The international community, particularly India and China (which invest in CHT infrastructure), must condition development aid on genuine autonomy. Ultimately, the solution is not secession—which is unrealistic—but a radical reimagining of Bangladesh as a plural, federal state. Without that, the Jumma people will continue to be strangers in their own hills.